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CIVIL RICO-INCENTIVE TO LITIGATE:
THE COURT'S REJECTION OF
STANDING REQUIREMENTS
Sedima v. Imrex, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court in Sedima v. Imrex1 made it
easier for a civil plaintiff to state a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act claim by eliminating standing requirements for
stating such a claim. 2
Fifteen years ago, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act Title IX Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO).3 But recently, business entities not associated with or-
ganized crime have been fighting RICO battles.4 These business
entities have taken advantage of RICO's section 1964(c) civil rem-
edy provision to garner treble damages when the business entities
can show they were injured by a racket. 5
The proliferation of civil RICO claims by business entities has
forced courts to seriously examine Congressional intent in enacting
RICO.6 Courts have struggled to weigh Congress' desire to make
RICO broad enough that racketeers can not avoid RICO provisions 7
against Congressional intent regarding prosecutors and private in-
dividuals using RICO as a weapon against organized crime. 8 While
courts have largely held that "mobster" involvement is not neces-
1 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
2 Id. at 3287.
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
4 See Sedima v. Imrex, 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984) (notes RICO claims against
such respected defendants as the American Express Company, E.F. Hutton and Com-
pany, Lloyd's of London, and Merrill Lynch).
5 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) states: "Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the
cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
6 See, e.g., Sedima, 741 F.2d at 500.
7 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 584 (1981) (RICO applies to legitimate
businesses as well as illegitimate businesses).
8 See Sutliff v. Donovan Companies, 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984).
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sary for a RICO cause of action,9 courts have employed two new
prerequisites for stating a claim under civil RICO to limit the
number of civil RICO plaintiffs: a prior RICO conviction and a spe-
cial RICO injury.10
The United States Supreme Court recently sought to clarify
civil RICO in Sedima v. Imrex.1" The plaintiff in Sedima alleged that
the defendant had cheated on a business deal causing the plaintiffs
financial losses. 12 The Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiffs
complaint, due to the plaintiffs failure to allege that the defendant
had been convicted of predicate RICO offenses and because the
plaintiff failed to allege a special RICO injury. 13 The Supreme
Court reversed in a five to four decision holding that neither a prior
conviction nor a special RICO injury was necessary to state a proper
civil RICO claim.' 4
After examining the facts in Sedima, this Note will discuss the
Court of Appeals' prior conviction requirement and trace the devel-
opment of the various special RICO injury requirements that courts
have employed as prerequisites to a civil RICO claim. Next, this
Note will present the Supreme Court's rationale for rejecting the
two prerequisites to stating a civil RICO claim and the dissent's rea-
sons for requiring a special RICO injury. This Note will then ana-
lyze the Court's decision and conclude that the Supreme Court
correctly rejected a prior conviction as a prerequisite to stating a
claim under civil RICO. This Note will conclude that while the dis-
sent's argument for the special RICO injury is logically compelling,
in the absence of clear Congressional intent to limit civil RICO
claims through pleading prerequisites, the majority was correct in
construing RICO broadly. Finally, this Note will propose a RICO
injury requirement that takes into account the majority's concerns
about construing RICO broadly and the dissent's concerns about
the logical interpretation of the statute.
II. FACTS
Sedima is a Belgian corporation that imports and exports vari-
ous parts manufactured in the United States and Europe.' 5 Imrex is
9 See, e.g., Owl Construction v. Ronald Adams Contractor, 727 F.2d 540 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
10 See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 503.
11 105 S. Ct. 3275.
12 Id. at 3279.
13 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 503.
14 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
15 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 484.
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an American corporation that exports aircraft-related parts.' 6
Sedima and Imrex contracted in 1979 to provide component
parts for a NATO subcontractor in Belgium.' 7 By the agreement,
the NATO subcontractor was to place orders for parts with
Sedima.18 Sedima, in turn, was to fill its orders for the NATO sub-
contractor with American parts that Sedima ordered from Imrex.1 9
Sedima and Imrex were to split the net proceeds.20
Sedima received $8.5 million worth of orders to place with Im-
rex.2' Sedima, however, became suspicious that Imrex was padding
its expense bills to deny Sedima its share of the proceeds from the
agreement.22 Sedima filed suit in the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of New York23 alleging that Imrex prepared fraudu-
lent purchase orders and invoices and intentionally overstated the
costs of purchasing and shipping parts for the joint venture. 24
In addition to common law claims of unjust enrichment and
breach of contract, Sedima alleged three RICO violations. 25 Ac-
cording to Sedima's complaint, Imrex overbilled it by at least
$175,000, for which Sedima sought treble damages and attorney's
fees under RICO section 1964(c). 26
The District Court dismissed Sedima's RICO claims because
Sedima failed to allege a RICO injury, "somehow different in kind
from the direct injury resulting from the predicate acts of racketeer-
ing activity." 27 The court of appeals affirmed and added that
Sedima's civil RICO claim was deficient because Sedima failed to
allege that Imrex had been convicted for the alleged RICO viola-
tions.28 The court of appeals determined that Congress intended to
impose standing requirements for civil RICO plaintiffs similar to the




19 105 S. Ct. at 3279.
20 Id.
21 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 484.
22 Id.
23 105 S. Ct. at 3279.
24 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 484.
25 Id. Sedima alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) which provides that "it shall
be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity .. "
26 105 S. Ct. at 3279.
27 Id. (citing Sedima v. Imrex, 574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)).
28 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 503.
29 Id. at 495. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982), provides treble damages to
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III. THE PRIOR CONVICTION REQUIREMENT
The court of appeals in Sedima distinguished all precedent in
order to require prior convictions for defendants' predicate offenses
before a plaintiff could have civil RICO standing.3 0 The court of
appeals found that a RICO section 1964 proceeding is inherently
criminal.3 1 Because Congress could not have intended civil defend-
ants to be stigmatized as criminals without being previously con-
victed, the court of appeals held that a prior conviction was
necessary for civil RICO proceedings.3 2
The court noted that the fifth amendment to the Constitution
protects persons from answering to infamous crimes without a
grand jury indictment.3 3 RICO is an infamous crime, according to
the court, and therefore unconvicted RICO defendants should not
have to answer to civil RICO claims.3 4 The standard of proof for a
jury in a civil case is less stringent than the standard in a criminal
case and the court of appeals was concerned that civil RICO defend-
ants would be too easily stigmatized by the 'racketeer' label without
a prior conviction.3 5 Labelling someone a racketeer causes a preju-
dicial taint for a civil jury, according to the court.3 6
The court of appeals wrote that the peculiar structure whereby
civil RICO defendants face inherently criminal charges, suggests
that "had Congress considered the problem, it would have intended
criminal convictions of at least the predicate crimes as a prerequisite
for civil RICO action."3 7
IV. THE SPECIAL RICO INJURY REQUIREMENT
Courts have attempted to limit the number of "garden variety"
fraud cases pleaded as civil RICO causes of action by imposing vari-
ous standing requirements. 38 These requirements have ranged from
alleging mobster involvement3 9 to alleging 'something more' than
antitrust plaintiffs if the plaintiffs allege an antitrust injury-an injury the antitrust laws
were designed to prevent. See Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977)
(antitrust laws protect competition not competitors).
30 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496-503.





36 Id. at 500 n.49 (citing United States v. Guiliano, 644 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1981))
(prejudicial taint inevitably surrounds label of 'racketeer').
37 Id. at 502.
38 See Trane Co. v. O'Connor Securities, 718 F.2d 26, 28 n.3 (2d Cir. 1983)(lists
various fraud actions for which courts rejected RICO claims).
39 See Adair v. Hunt International Resources, 526 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 198 1)(court
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predicate RICO offenses.40 Although courts have employed a vari-
ety of civil RICO standing requirements, no court has succinctly de-
fined a special RICO injury. 4 1
Courts that have applied the mobster involvement requirement
for civil RICO standing have based their decisions on the title of the
Act (Organized Crime Control Act) and the legislative intent that
RICO should be a method for attacking organized crime. 42 Most
circuits have dropped the mobster involvement requirement be-
cause courts have recognized that Congress intended RICO to be
applied broadly to effectuate its remedial purposes.43 Congress un-
derstood that in order to attack organized crime effectively, RICO
had to be drafted in broad terms even though legitimate businesses
may be accused of RICO violations. 44 Congress chose to proscribe
conduct rather than organized crime status.45
After courts discredited the mobster involvement requirement,
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in North Bar-
rington Development v. Fanslow46 created a competitive injury require-
ment. The court in Fanslow noted that Congress based civil RICO's
provisions on the Clayton Act's recovery provisions, so the court
determined that civil RICO plaintiffs, like Clayton Act plaintiffs,
must allege a competitive injury.4 7 According to the court in Fan-
slow, Congress intended RICO to provide a remedy for indirect vic-
tims of racketeering enterprises because state law protects direct
victims. 48 The court defined the indirect victims of racketeering en-
terprises as those who had been injured competitively because the
victims were forced to compete with racketeering enterprises. 49
dismissed RICO claim because plaintiffs failed to allege that defendants were involved
with organized crime in land fraud action).
40 See Landmark Savings & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 208 (E.D. Mich.
1981) (court dismissed RICO claim because plaintiff failed to allege a racketeering enter-
prise injury in securities fraud claim).
41 See Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347, 1352-53 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
42 See Adair, 526 F. Supp. at 747.
43 See Sutliff, 727 F.2d at 654; Moss, 719 F.2d at 21; Bunker Ramo v. United Business
Forms, 713 F.2d 1272, 1287 n.6 (7th Cir. 1983)(organized crime requirement is
specious).
44 See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581. Judge Posner elaborated on Turkette in Sutiff, 727
F.2d at 654: "Congress deliberately cast the net of liability wide, being more concerned
to avoid opening loopholes through which the minions of organized crime might crawl
to freedom than to avoid making garden-variety frauds actionable in federal treble-dam-
age proceedings-the price of eliminating all possible loopholes."
45 United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977)("The legislative
intent was to make RICO violations dependent upon behavior, not status.").
46 547 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
47 Id. at 211.
48 Id. at 210.
49 Id. at 211.
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Courts have eliminated the competitive injury requirement by
distinguishing the purposes behind the antitrust laws and RICO.50
While Congress designed the antitrust laws to preserve competition,
it designed RICO to ruin organized crime's economic power.51
Courts do not impose antitrust penalties to destroy a competitor
and thereby injure competition, but eliminating a racketeering en-
terprise is a desirable side effect of imposing civil RICO penalties. 52
While the court in Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Califor-
nia5 3 did not adopt a competitive injury requirement, it expanded
on that concept to require that civil RICO plaintiffs allege a com-
mercial injury.54 Since section 1964(c) provides remedies for per-
sons injured in their business or property and RICO's primary
purpose was to protect legitimate businesses from infiltration by
racketeers, the court in Van Schaick concluded that RICO protected
only business losses.5 5 The court rejected the private plaintiffs'
RICO allegations, because RICO has a commercial orientation and
thus is not available to every consumer.5 6
Some courts have required a special RICO injury without defin-
ing it.5 7 The court in Lazdmark Savings & Loan v. Rhoades58 required
"something more [than] or different from predicate acts" of a RICO
violation for standing to sue under civil RICO.5 9 The court defined
this "racketeering enterprise injury" only as an injury that would
"frequently overlap but [is not] ... necessarily the same" as a com-
petitive injury.60
Two courts that have required something more than an allega-
tion of predicate RICO offenses have been more specific. 61 These
courts noted that section 1964(c) provides a remedy to victims of a
50 See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir. 1983)(state insurer's civil
RICO claim as liquidator versus parent company for increasing liability in insolvency
was not subject to antitrust standing requirements, because civil RICO has a "broad
mission" and organized crime activity "is thought to be malum in se"); Bennett v. Berg,
685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1982)(retirement community residents' mismanagement
claim stated a civil RICO cause of action).
51 Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1059.
52 See Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic
Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L. Q. 1009, 1042 (1980).
53 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982).
54 Id. at 1137.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Eisenberg, 564 F. Supp. at 1352.
58 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
59 Id. at 208.
60 Id.
61 See Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 742 F.2d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 1984);
Bankers Trust v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1984).
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section 1962 violation.62 Section 1962 concerns an illegal pattern of
racketeering activity,6 3 and these courts reasoned that plaintiffs
should therefore have standing under section 1964(c) only when
they claim an injury by the pattern of racketeering activity, not in-
jury for the predicate acts of that pattern.64
Courts have rejected all the above standing requirements for
civil RICO plaintiffs on the grounds that Congress intended RICO
to be construed broadly.65 Courts have been reluctant to impose
standing requirements where Congress has not explicitly called for
any.66 According to some courts, it is a legislative, not a judicial re-
sponsibility to draft civil RICO standing requirements. 67
V. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN SEDIMA
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
and held that Sedima alleged sufficient facts in its complaint to make
out a civil RICO claim.68
First, the Court rejected the prior conviction requirement for
standing to sue under civil RICO.69 Although section 1964(c) re-
quires an injury by "violation" of section 1962, a violation is not
necessarily the same as a criminal conviction. 70 The Court noted
that Congress' silence on the issue of whether a conviction is re-
quired to state a civil RICO cause of action indicated that a plaintiff
need not allege a prior conviction. 71
A prior conviction requirement would be against public policy,
according to the Court, because civil plaintiffs would only be able to
recover if the government successfully prosecuted the defendant. 72
The Court argued that the preponderance of the evidence standard
for civil RICO juries should remain intact, despite the fact that a
RICO conviction in a criminal proceeding would require proof be-
62 Alexander Grant, 742 F.2d at 413; Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 516.
63 See supra note 25.
64 Alexander Grant, 742 F.2d at 413; Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 516.
65 See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581; Sutlif, 727 F.2d at 654; Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1358;
Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1064.
66 See Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1358.
67 See Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1064 ("Insofar as the door of the federal courthouse is
similarly opened by RICO in a civil context, we are cautioned by the Supreme Court that
broad Congressional action should not be restricted by the courts in the name of
federalism.").
68 105 S. Ct. at 3287-88.
69 Id. at 3284.
70 Id. at 3281.
71 Id. at 3282.
72 Id. at 3282 n.9.
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yond a reasonable doubt.73 A criminal RICO conviction require-
ment could in effect change the standard of proof for a civil action,
because a RICO plaintiff that presents convictions as evidence in its
claim presents proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
has committed the violations in question. 74 Eliminating the convic-
tion requirement poses no Constitutional double jeopardy
problems, the Court reasoned, because treble damages and attor-
ney's fees available under civil RICO are not punitive.75
The Court next rejected the special RICO injury requirement.76
The Court reasoned that since no court has succinctly defined the
special RICO injury and Congress did not attempt to define any
such injury, the Court ought not to try.77 Congress intended civil
RICO to be construed broadly to effectuate its remedial purposes,
so the Court was not compelled to limit civil RICO standing without
Congress' specific indication that it desired to limit the number of
civil RICO plaintiffs by requiring a special RICO injury allegation.78
VI. THE DISSENT IN SEDIMA
Justice Marshall wrote the dissenting opinion.79 Justice Mar-
shall did not address the prior conviction requirement, because he
would have affirmed the court of appeals and dismissed the case for
failure to allege a special RICO injury.80
Justice Marshall warned against allowing RICO's treble dam-
ages provision to give plaintiffs an incentive to federalize state fraud
claims.8 Civil RICO causes of action, Justice Marshall reasoned,
have become too common in suits between legitimate businesses
and Congress did not intend that the civil RICO statute be used so
frequently.8 2 Justice Marshall interpreted the statutory language
and legislative history as requiring that civil RICO plaintiffs allege
73 Id. at 3282.
74 Whether the defendant violated RICO section 1962 would still be a jury question.
Thejury would have to consider whether the violations constitute a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity for recovery under civil RICO. See United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208,
1222 (9th Cir. 1982).
75 105 S. Ct. at 3283 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988). For a discussion of the punitive as-
pects of civil RICO see infra notes 126-142 and accompanying text.
76 105 S. Ct. at 3285.
77 Id. at 3284. ("The court below is not alone in struggling to define 'racketeering
injury,' and the difficulty of that task itself cautions against imposing such a
requirement.").
78 Id. at 3286.
79 Id. at 3293 (Justices Brennan, Powell and Blackmun joined in the dissent).
80 Id. at 3304 n.2.
81 Id. at 3294.
82 Id. at 3296.
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injury by a "pattern of racketeering activity," not merely injury by
the predicate acts comprising that pattern.8 3 RICO was designed to
provide recovery for injuries not previously compensable, Justice
Marshall wrote, and therefore plaintiffs should not be able to use




Courts have struggled with interpreting the legislative silence
on the prior conviction and special RICO injury requirements for
stating a civil RICO claim.8 5 This struggle has led to divergent
holdings on the standing requirements.8 6 The majority in Sedima
wrote, "Had Congress intended to impose this novel requirement,
there would have been at least some mention of it in the legislative
history, even if not in the statute."87 The court of appeals, however,
viewed the legislative silence differently and speculated on what
Congress "would have" required given Congress' method of draft-
ing civil RICO.8 8
THE PRIOR CONVICTION
There are three arguments that demonstrate why a civil RICO
plaintiff need not show a prior conviction in order to plead a civil
RICO cause of action properly. First, Congress did not intend that
a civil RICO plaintiff would have to prove a prior conviction.8 9 Sec-
ond, the structure of the RICO statute implies that no prior convic-
tion is necessary to sue under civil RICO.90 Third, the structure of
similar statutes does not suggest a prior conviction requirement. 91
The above three arguments in and of themselves do not answer the
83 Id. at 3297.
84 Id. at 3304.
The construction I describe offers a powerful remedy to the honest businessmen
with whom Congress was concerned, who might have had no recourse against a
'racketeer' prior to enactment of the statute. At the same time, this construction
avoids both the theoretical and practical problems outlined in Part I. Under this
view, traditional state law claims are not federalized; federal remedial schemes are
not inevitably displaced or superceded; and, consequently, ordinary commercial
disputes are not misguidedly placed within the scope of civil RICO.
Id.
85 See Id. at 3282; Sedima, 741 F.2d at 501.
86 Haroco v. Am. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir.
1984).
87 105 S. Ct. at 3282.
88 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 501.
89 105 S. Ct. at 3281.
90 USACO Coal v. Carbomin Energy, 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982).
91 105 S. Ct. at 3281.
1094 [Vol. 76
CIVIL RICO STANDING REQUIREMENTS
concerns that separating government and civil actions cause jury
standard and double jeopardy problems, but these concerns can be
allayed separately. 92
The best evidence of Congressional intent not to require a
prior conviction for standing to sue under civil RICO is the fact that
prior convictions are not included in section 1964(c).9 3 RICO is a
carefully drafted statute, the Supreme Court wrote; if Congress had
meant only to provide recovery against convicted defendants Con-
gress would have inserted "conviction" in section 1964(c).9 4 Con-
gress used "conviction" in other provisions, so "violation" in
section 1964(c) ought not to be read as requiring a conviction.9 5
One Congressman objected to the provisions of civil RICO because
"there need not be a conviction."9 6 This objection indicates that
Congress was aware of the prior conviction issue. Thus Congress
intentionally omitted the prior conviction requirement from the civil
RICO statute.
RICO's statutory structure gives further evidence against a
prior conviction requirement. Congress' intent to separate criminal
and civil RICO provisions is evidenced by section 1963, which
makes a violation of section 1962 a crime.9 7 If Congress had wanted
to include a requirement that civil RICO defendants be previously
convicted, Congress would have referred to the section 1963 crimi-
nal provision in section 1964(c).98 Instead, section 1964(c) refers to
section 1962, which outlined "unlawful activities." 99
Courts have studied statutes similar to RICO to determine
whether a prior conviction requirement exists. 100 The court of ap-
peals found the difference between the Clayton Act and civil RICO
to be instructive: The Clayton Act authorizes treble damages for in-
juries "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws"' 0 '
while RICO authorizes treble damages for injuries "by reason of a
violation of section 1962."102 In drafting RICO section 1964(c), the
court of appeals noted that Congress hdapted the civil recovery pro-
92 Id. at 3282, 3283.
93 Id. at 3281.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 3281 n.7.
96 Id. at 3282 (quoting 116 Cong. Rec. 35342 (1970)).
97 USACO Coal, 689 F.2d at 95 n.1.
98 Id.
99 Id. See also Bunker Ramo, 713 F.2d at 1287.
100 See, e.g., Sedima, 741 F.2d at 498.
101 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
102 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); Sedima, 741 F.2d at 498.
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visions of the Clayton Act.103 The court of appeals determined that
Congress substituted "a violation" for "anything forbidden" in
drafting civil RICO because Congress wanted a prior conviction re-
quirement for standing to sue under civil RICO.1 0 4
The Supreme Court on the other hand argued that neither un-
lawful activities nor violations are necessarily the same as convic-
tions.' 05 The majority in Sedmia defines a violation as "a failure to
adhere to legal requirements." 10 6 The Supreme Court has clearly
separated civil and criminal provisions in other statutes.10 7 For in-
stance, private and governmental actions in antitrust statutes are
distinct. 10 8
Despite the above three arguments against a prior conviction
requirement, the court of appeals in Sedima adopted such a require-
ment partially because the court of appeals feared that distinct pri-
vate and governmental actions in RICO cases would lead to jury
standard problems. 10 9 Criminal RICO defendants are convicted
when the jury is convinced of their guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.110 But in a civil case, plaintiffs can recover if they can prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants were in-
volved in racketeering activity."'I This worried the court of appeals
because plaintiffs could attach the racketeering stigma to respected
business entities by proving that the defendant was involved in rack-
eteering activity by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than
beyond a reasonable doubt."12 The court of appeals found that la-
belling defendants racketeers in a civil proceeding is tantamount to
labelling defendants criminals."13 Thus, the court of appeals rea-
soned, defendants in a civil RICO proceeding ought to be entitled
to some of the protections afforded defendants in a criminal pro-
ceeding such as a reasonable doubt standard of proof for the
103 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 495.
104 Id. at 498.
105 105 S. Ct. at 3281.
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S. 391 (1938)(acquittal on tax evasion charges does not preclude fifty percent assess-
ment on dificiency).
108 105 S. Ct. at 3282.
109 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 501-02 ("[I]n the absence of previous convictions a civil plain-
tiff must carry a burden equal to that in a criminal case in proving that criminal conduct.
Yet it would be extraordinarily difficult for juries to understand the different burdens of
proof required for different elements of a civil case.").
110 Id.
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jury. 114
But the Supreme Court had already tackled the court of ap-
peal's jury standard dilemma."15 The Supreme Court upheld the
preponderance standard for quasi-criminal civil proceedings in
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms.116 In that case, a jury
acquitted the defendant of illegally harboring firearms, and the gov-
ernment sought forfeiture of the firearms in a subsequent civil pro-
ceeding.1 17 The Court rejected the defendant's contention that the
civil claim was barred by double jeopardy.' 1" 8 The Court noted that
a defendant is not innocent merely because a jury holds a reason-
able doubt as to the defendant's guilt.1 1 9 Thejury may hold a rea-
sonable doubt in a criminal proceeding for a variety of reasons not
present in a civil proceeding: improper arrest, prosecutorial impro-
priety, or a poor evidence gathering effort by the prosecution. 120
These factors have no bearing on whether a plaintiff is entitled to
remedial recovery from a defendant. 12 1 A plaintiff ought to be enti-
tled to recover from a defendant if a plaintiff can establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff was injured by the
actions of the defendant. 122
The policy reasons for allowing a plaintiff civil RICO recovery
without a prior conviction are related to the reasons for separate
jury standards in civil and criminal cases. If the civil RICO statute
requires a conviction to make out a cause of action, the injured
plaintiff would be forced to rely on government prosecutors. 123 An
injured plaintiff who is required to show that a defendant has previ-
ously been convicted of RICO offenses would have no recovery if
the government simply chose not to prosecute the defendant.' 24
RICO was never meant to be so limited, rather Congress intended
RICO to be a means for the government as well as private plaintiffs
to attack organized crime. 125
114 Id.
115 105 S. Ct. at 3282.
116 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
117 Id. at 356.
118 Id. at 361.
119 Id. ("But an acquittal on criminal charges does not prove that the defendant is
innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.").
120 See id. at 361-362.
121 Id. at 362 ("It is clear that the difference in the relative burdens of proof in the
criminal and civil actions precludes the application of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.").
122 Id.
123 105 S. Ct. at 383 n.9.
124 Id.
125 See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 585.
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The majority in Sedima summarily dismissed the argument that
RICO poses a doublejeopardy problem.1 26 The argument is that by
allowing plaintiffs to recover treble damages and attorney's fees
from a defendant and by subjecting the defendant to criminal penal-
ties, the RICO statute violates the Fifth Amendment provision
against double jeopardy. 127 A convicted RICO violator who is sub-
ject to treble damages and attorney's fees in a subsequent civil suit
may be subjected to double jeopardy if treble damages and attor-
ney's fees are punitive in a criminal way. 128
Justice Brandeis has written that "in the civil enforcement of a
remedial sanction there can be no double jeopardy."' 129 But in later
cases, the Supreme Court has set up a stricter test for what consti-
tutes double jeopardy.130 In United States v. Ward,13' the court used
a two step test to determine whether a statute violated double jeop-
ardy.' 32 First, the court asked whether Congress expressly labelled
the penalty as civil or criminal. 133 Second, if Congress sought to en-
act a civil penalty, was the penalty "so punitive either in purposes or
effect as to negate that intention."' 134
Congress intended section 1964(c) to be a civil remedy, l3 5 so a
court should look to the purpose and effect of treble damages and
attorneys fees in section 1964(c).' 36 The court in Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez 13 7 established seven factors for determining whether a
statute is criminally punitive in either purpose or effect:
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint,
[2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment,
[3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
[4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment, retribution and deterrence,
[5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
[6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may be rationally con-
nected is assignable for it, and
[7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
126 105 S. Ct. at 3283.
127 U.S. Const. amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...
128 See Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-249.
129 Helvering, 303 U.S. at 404.
130 See Ward, 448 U.S. at 242; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
131 448 U.S. 242.
132 Id. at 248-49.
133 Id. at 248.
134 Id. at 248-49.
135 The title to 18 U.S.C. § 1964 is "Civil Remedies."
136 See Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-249.
137 372 U.S. 144.
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assigned.1 3 8
The fourth factor above may have some significance for civil
RICO. There is some evidence that Congress intended civil RICO
to be punitive thus, civil RICO may be in violation of the Constitu-
tion's double jeopardy provision. 139 Treble damages generally are
not considered punitive,' 40 but one scholar questioned whether
Congress could have drafted section 1964(c) as a non-punitive pro-
vision in the midst of ten titles worth of punishment in the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act.141
Because the proof is unclear as to whether Congress intended
civil RICO to be punitive in effect, civil RICO should not be held to
violate double jeopardy. 142
THE SPECIAL RICO INJURY REQUIREMENT
Congress may have drafted the treble damages provision in civil
RICO to compensate special RICO injuries.' 43 The special RICO
injury requirement is more appropriate if courts do not characterize
civil RICO remedies as punitive. The majority in Sedima referred to
civil RICO's treble damages and attorneys fees as "incentive[s] to
litigate." 144 But plaintiffs would only need incentives to litigate
claims where their injuries are not directly attributable to defend-
ants' predicate fraud acts, because plaintiffs would readily pursue
state remedies for garden variety fraud claims. 145
The definition of the special injury requirement that Congress
138 Id. at 168-69.
139 The court in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27-8 (1983) quotes from re-
marks by Senator McClellan on RICO's forfeiture provision (§ 1963(a)(1))). McClellan
noted that the provision was designed to punish, deter, incapacitate and remove organ-
ized crime from legitimate business. While the court in Russello had no need to follow
McClellan's remarks on civil remedies, McClellan seemed to imply that civil RICO provi-
sions were punitive and written to deter racketeering. See 116 Cong. Rec. 18955 (1970)
(Remarks of Sen. McClellan).
140 See, e.g., Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 485-86 (treble damages in antitrust case which
measures the awards by a multiple of the injury actually proved, is designed primarily
as a remedy.").
141 Comment, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for
"Criminal Activity", 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 192, 211. Judge Caramone wrote in dissent in
Sedima, 741 F.2d at 507, that treble damages are partly punitive and partly compensatory
so treble damages need not be considered punitive.
142 See Ward, 448 U.S. at 251. The court in Ward found that the respondent did not
offer the "clearest proof' that the respondent's civil penalty was punitive in purpose or
effect (as those terms were defined in Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144) and rejected the
respondent's claim that his civil penalty violated the Constitution's double jeopardy
clause. Id.
143 See, e.g., Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d 511, 517.
144 105 S. Ct. at 3284.
145 Id. at 3294.
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may have thought deserved treble damages has eluded most
courts. 14 6 For this reason, the majority in Sedima rejected the special
injury requirement in the wake of the legislative silence on the is-
sue. 147 The majority in Sedima wrote that courts should not rewrite
legislation to create a special RICO injury requirement. 148
Through civil RICO, Congress sought to compensate injuries
caused by a pattern of racketeering activity. 149 Civil RICO recovery
is available to plaintiffs who are injured by reason of a violation of
RICO section 1962.150 While the majority lists indictable and
chargeable offenses under section 1961,151 section 1962 is con-
cerned with a pattern of racketeering activity. Congress, then,
sought to provide a remedy for injury by the pattern described in
section 1962 rather than the predicate acts described in section
1961 because section 1961 is not mentioned in the civil remedy pro-
vision of section 1964(c). 152
The court in Bankers Trust v. Rhoades 53 presented a further ar-
gument in favor of a special RICO injury allegation:
If a plaintiffs injury is that caused by the predicate acts themselves, he
is injured regardless of whether or not there is a pattern; hence he
cannot be said to be injured by the pattern, and the pattern cannot be
said to be the but for cause of the injury. 154
The majority in Sedima summarized the elements of a pattern of
racketeering activity1 55 as required by section 1962, but in spite of
that summary wrote, "the compensable injury necessarily is the
harm caused by predicate acts." '1 56 Congress however, intended
RICO to supplement, not supplant, the state laws that would ordi-
narily apply to fraud cases. 157
146 See, e.g., Id. at 3284.
147 See id. at 3284 n.ll.
148 Id. at 3287 ("It is not for the judiciary to eliminate the private action in situations
where Congress has provided it simply because plaintiffs are not taking advantage of it
in its more difficult applications.").
149 Id. at 3297 (dissenting opinion).
150 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
151 105 S. Ct. at 3284-85.
152 See Id. at 3297 (dissenting opinion).
153 741 F.2d at 511.
154 Id. at 517 (emphasis in the original).
155 105 S. Ct. at 3285.
A violation of § 1962(c) requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pat-
tern (4) of racketeering activity. The plaintiff must, of course, allege each of these
elements to state a claim. Conducting an enterprise that affects interstate com-
merce is obviously not in itself a violation of section 1962, nor is mere commission
of the predicate offenses.
Id.
156 Id. at 3286.
157 Haroco, 747 F.2d at 392.
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Courts have been able to give examples of how a person gets
injured by a pattern of racketeering activity, 158 but have been unable
to formulate a definition of the injury.1 59 The courts' inability to
define the injury, however, does not justify a conclusion that no spe-
cial RICO injury requirement exists as the majority concluded in
Sedima.160
Because the pattern of racketeering activity is different from its
component predicate acts, Congress intended further compensation
for an injury by the pattern than for injury by predicate acts
alone.161 RICO defines a pattern of racketeering activity in section
1961 to require at least two acts of racketeering activity within ten
years of each other.162 The majority in Seditna, however, noted that
two acts are necessary, but not sufficient for a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity.163 The Court wrote, "in common parlance two of any-
thing do not generally form a 'pattern.' "164 A pattern, according to
the Court, requires a continuity plus a relationship.' 6 5 The court in
Bankers Trust called this continuity plus relationship the confluence
that constitutes the section 1962 violation. 166
In compensating a RICO plaintiff, a court should focus on the
harm caused by the pattern of racketeering activity, not the harm
caused by the predicate acts. 167 The pattern of racketeering activity
may be composed of predicate acts, but Congress sought to provide
remedy for injury by the pattern. 168 The court in Alexander Grant &
Company v. Tifany Industries' 69 found that the summation of predi-
cate mail and wire fraud offenses constituted a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity for the purpose of stating a civil RICO claim.' 70 The
distinction between the holdings in Sedima and Alexander Grant is that
the majority in Sedima wrote that the harm in RICO is caused by the
predicate acts, 17' while the court in Alexander Grant wrote that the
158 See, e.g., 105 S. Ct. at 3303; Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 517.
159 See, e.g., Eisenberg, 564 F. Supp. at 1352-53.
160 105 S. Ct. at 3284.
161 See Alexander Grant, 742 F.2d at 413; Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 516.
162 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
163 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 516.
167 See Alexander Grant, 742 F.2d at 413.
168 See Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 516. ("Section 1964(c) does not provide a private
right of recovery unless the conduct that caused the injury was 'a violation of section
1962.'. . . Commission of two or more predicate acts is but an element of a section 1962
violation; those acts do not themselves constitute the section 1962 violation.").
169 742 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1984).
170 Id. at 413.
171 105 S. Ct. at 3286. See supra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
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harm comes from the pattern of racketeering activity. 172
Whether a plaintiff has been injured by a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity is an appropriate question for a jury. 173 Whenever a
plaintiff can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, 174 that it
was injured by a group of events that a jury believes constitute a
pattern of racketeering activity, that plaintiff ought to be entitled to
pursue treble damages and attorneys fees under civil RICO.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court correctly rejected the prior conviction re-
quirement for stating a civil RICO claim. Civil RICO provides a
remedy for persons injured by a violation of RICO section 1962, but
civil RICO does not mention the need for a conviction. Congress
intended civil RICO to be a means for private plaintiffs to attack
organized crime separately and distinctly from government actions
against RICO offenders.
Congress provided treble damages for civil RICO plaintiffs to
compensate for injuries by a pattern of racketeering activity, not to
punish RICO offenders and not to compensate for garden variety
frauds. Congress did not explicitly require a special RICO injury
allegation for stating a claim under civil RICO, but a special RICO
injury allegation makes sense because plaintiffs can recover for
predicate RICO acts through state fraud claims. A jury should de-
termine whether a plaintiff has been injured by a pattern of racke-
teering activity.
The Supreme Court and the courts of appeals struggled over
whether Congress intended to limit civil RICO standing in any way.
The Court found congressional intent unclear and construed civil
RICO broadly. It is now Congress' responsibility to define any
standing limitations for suing under civil RICO.
TERRENCE P. CANADE
172 742 F.2d at 413.
173 Brooklier, 685 F.2d at 1222; United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 395 (2d Cir.
1979).
174 See supra notes 101-16 and accompanying text.
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